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Abstract. This paper studies n-player games where players beliefs about
their opponents behaviour are capacities. The concept of an equilibrium under
uncertainty was introduced J.Dow and S.Werlang (J Econ. Theory 64 (1994)
205–224)) for two players and was extended to n-player games by J.Eichberger
and D.Kelsey (Games Econ. Behav. 30 (2000) 183–215). Expected utility
was expressed by Choquet integral. We consider the concept of an equilibrium
under uncertainty in this paper but with expected utility expressed by Sugeno
integral. Existence of such an equilibrium is demonstrated using some abstract
non-linear convexity on the space of capacities.
1. Introduction
The classical Nash equilibrium theory is based on fixed point theory and was
developed in frames of linear convexity. The mixed strategies of a player are prob-
ability (additive) measures on a set of pure strategies. But an interest to Nash
equilibria in more general frames is rapidly growing in last decades. There are
also results about Nash equilibrium for non-linear convexities. For instance, Briec
and Horvath proved in [1] existence of Nash equilibrium point for B-convexity and
MaxPlus convexity. Let us remark that MaxPlus convexity is related to idempotent
(Maslov) measures in the same sense as linear convexity is related to probability
measures.
We can use additive measures only when we know precisely probabilities of all
events considered in a game. However it is not a case in many modern economic
models. The decision theory under uncertainty considers a model when proba-
bilities of states are either not known or imprecisely specified. Gilboa [7] and
Schmeidler [14] axiomatized expectations expressed by Choquet integrals attached
to non-additive measures called capacities, as a formal approach to decision-making
under uncertainty. Dow and Werlang [3] used this approach for two players game
where belief of each player about a choice of the strategy by the other player is
a capacity. They introduced some equilibrium notion for such games and proved
its existence. This result was extended onto games with arbitrary finite number of
players [6].
Kozhan and Zaricznyi introduced in [8] a formal mathematical concept of Nash
equilibrium of a game where players are allowed to form non-additive beliefs about
opponent’s decision but also to play their mixed non-additive strategies. Such
game is called by authors game in capacities. The expected payoff function was
there defined using a Choquet integral. Kozhan and Zaricznyi proved existence
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theorem using a linear convexity on the space of capacities which is preserved by
Choquet integral.
An alternative to so-called Choquet expected utility model is the qualitative
decision theory. The corresponding expected utility is expressed by Sugeno integral.
See for example papers [4], [5], [2], [13] and others. Sugeno integral chooses a
median value of utilities which is qualitative counterpart of the averaging operation
by Choquet integral. It was introduced in [11] the general mathematical concept
of Nash equilibrium of a game in capacities with expected payoff function defined
by Sugeno integral. To prove existence theorem for this case, it was considered
some non-linear convexity on the space of capacities generated by capacity monad
structure.
It was noticed in [8] that ”there is no direct interpretation of the game in non-
additive mixed strategies”. So, formal mathematical concept of Nash equilibrium
for capacities considered in [8] and [11] has rather theoretical character. We consider
in this paper the equilibrium notion from [3] and [6] for a game with expected payoff
function defined by Sugeno integral. We prove existence of such equilibrium using
above mentioned convexity on the space of capacities.
2. Games with non-additive beliefs
By Comp we denote the category of compact Hausdorff spaces (compacta) and
continuous maps. For each compactum X we denote by C(X) the Banach space of
all continuous functions on X with the usual sup-norm. In what follows, all spaces
and maps are assumed to be in Comp except for R and maps in sets C(X) with X
compact Hausdorff.
We need the definition of capacity on a compactum X . We follow a terminol-
ogy of [9]. A function ν which assign each closed subset A of X a real number
ν(A) ∈ [0, 1] is called an upper-semicontinuous capacity on X if the three following
properties hold for each closed subsets F and G of X :
1. ν(X) = 1, ν(∅) = 0,
2. if F ⊂ G, then ν(F ) ≤ ν(G),
3. if ν(F ) < a, then there exists an open set O ⊃ F such that ν(B) < a for each
compactum B ⊂ O.
We extend a capacity ν to all open subsets U ⊂ X by the formula ν(U) =
sup{ν(K) | K is a closed subset of X such that K ⊂ U}.
It was proved in [9] that the space MX of all upper-semicontinuous capacities
on a compactum X is a compactum as well, if a topology on MX is defined by
a subbase that consists of all sets of the form O−(F, a) = {c ∈ MX | c(F ) < a},
where F is a closed subset of X , a ∈ [0, 1], and O+(U, a) = {c ∈ MX | c(U) > a},
where U is an open subset of X , a ∈ [0, 1]. Since all capacities we consider here are
upper-semicontinuous, in the following we call elements of MX simply capacities.
There is considered in [8] a tensor product for capacities, which is a continuous
map ⊗ : MX1 × MX2 → M(X1 × X2) such that for each i ∈ {1, 2} we have
M(pi) ◦ ⊗ = pri where pi : X1 × X2 → Xi and pri : MX1 × MX2 → MXi
are natural projections. This definition is based on the capacity monad structure.
We give there a direct formulae for evaluating tensor product of capacities. For
µ1 ∈ MX1, µ2 ∈ MX2 and B ⊂ X1 × X2 we put µ1 ⊗ µ2(B) = sup{t ∈ [0, 1] |
µ1({x ∈ X1 | µ2(p2(({x} × X2) ∩ B)) ≥ t} ≥ t}. Note that, despite the space
of capacities contains the space of probability measures, the tensor product of
capacities does not extend tensor product of probability measures. It was noticed
in [8] that we can extend the definition of tensor product to any finite number of
factors by induction.
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Lemma 1. Let Ai be a closed subset of a compactum Xi and µi ∈MXi such that
µi(Xi \Ai) = 0 for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then ⊗ni=1µi(
∏n
i=1Xi \
∏n
i=1Ai) = 0.
Proof. Consider the case n = 2. Let B any compact subset of (X1×X2)\(A1×A2).
For any t > 0 consider the set Kt = {x ∈ X1 | µ2(p2(({x} × X2) ∩ B)) ≥ t}. If
x ∈ A1, then p2(({x} ×X2) ∩B) ⊂ X2 \A2, hence x /∈ Kt. Thus Kt ⊂ X \A1 and
we obtain µ1 ⊗ µ2(B) = 0.
The general case could be obtained by induction. 
Let us describe the Sugeno integral with respect to a capacity µ ∈ MX . Fix
any increasing homeomorphism ψ : (0, 1) → R. We put additionally ψ(0) = −∞,
ψ(1) = +∞ and assume −∞ < t < +∞ for each t ∈ R. We consider for each
function f ∈ C(X) an integral defined by the formulae∫ Sug
X
fdµ = max{t ∈ R | µ(f−1([t,+∞))) ≥ ψ−1(t)}
Let us remark that we use some modification from [12] of Sugeno integral. The
original Sugeno integral [15] ”ignores” function values outside the interval [0, 1] and
we introduce a ”correction” homeomorphism ψ to avoid this problem.
Now, we are going to introduce notion of equilibrium under uncertainty for games
where belief of each player about a choice of the strategy by the other player is a
capacity. We follow definitions and denotation from [6] with the only difference
that we use the Sugeno integral for expected payoff instead the Choquet integral.
We consider a n-players game f : X =
∏n
i=1Xi → R
n with compact Hausdorff
spaces of strategies Xi. The coordinate function pi : X → R we call payoff function
of i-th player. For i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we denote by X−i =
∏
j 6=iXj the set of strategy
combinations which players other than i could choose. For x ∈ X the corresponding
point in X−i we denote by x−i. In contrast to standard game theory, beliefs of i-th
player about opponents behaviour are represented by non-additive measures (or
capacities) on X−i.
For i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we consider the expected payoff function Pi : Xi×MX−i → R
defined as follows Pi(xi, ν) =
∫ Sug
X
−i
pxii dν where the function p
xi
i : X−i → R is
defined by the formulae pxii (x−i) = pi(xi, x−i), xi ∈ Xi and ν ∈MX−i.
We are going to prove continuity of Pi. We will need some notations and a
technical lemma. Let f : X×Y → R be a function. Consider any x ∈ X and t ∈ R.
Denote Ax≤t = {y ∈ Y | f(x, y) ≤ t}. We also will use analogous notations A
x
≥t,
Ax<t and A
x
>t.
Lemma 2. Let f : X × Y → R be a continuous function on the product X × Y of
compacta X and Y . Then for each x ∈ X, t ∈ R and δ > 0 there exists an open
neighborhood O of x such that Az≤t ⊂ A
x
<t+δ (A
z
≥t ⊂ A
x
>t−δ) for each z ∈ O.
Proof. Let us prove the first statement of the lemma. We have two compact sets
{x}×Ax≤t and {x}×A
x
≥t+δ. Consider its open neighborhoods V = {(z, y) ∈ X×Y |
f(z, y) < t+ δ2} and U = {(z, y) ∈ X × Y | f(z, y) > t+
δ
2}. Since {x} ×A
x
≤t and
{x} × Ax≥t+δ are compact, we can choose an open set O ⊂ X and two open sets
W1, W2 ⊂ Y such that {x}×Ax≤t ⊂ O×W1 ⊂ V and {x}×A
x
≥t+δ ⊂ O×W2 ⊂ U .
Consider any z ∈ O and y ∈ Y such that f(z, y) ≤ t. Then y /∈W2 ⊃ Ax≥t+δ, hence
y ∈ Ax<t+δ.
The proof of the second statement is the same. 
Lemma 3. The map Pi is continuous.
Proof. Consider any x ∈ Xi and ν0 ∈ MX−i and put Pi(x, ν0) = t ∈ R. Consider
any ε > 0. By Lemma 2 we can choose a neighborhood O1 of x such that for each
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z ∈ O1 we haveAz≥t+ ε
2
⊂ Ax>t+ ε
4
. Put V1 = {ν ∈M(X−i | ν(Ax≥t+ ε
4
) < ψ−1(t+ ε4 )},
then V1 is a neighborhood of ν0.
We also can choose a neighborhood O2 of x such that for each z ∈ O2 we have
Az≤t− ε
2
⊂ Ax<t− ε
4
. Put V2 = {ν ∈ M(X−i | ν(Ax≥t− ε
4
) > ψ−1(t − ε2 )}, then V2 is a
neighborhood of ν0.
Put O = O1 ∩O2 and V = V1 ∩ V2. Consider any (z, ν) ∈ O × V . Since (z, ν) ∈
O1 × V1, we have ν(Az≥t+ ε
2
) ≤ ν(Ax>t+ ε
4
) ≤ ν(Ax≥t+ ε
4
) < ψ−1(t+ ε4 ) < ψ
−1(t + ε2 ).
Hence Pi(z, ν) < t+ ε.
On the other hand, since (z, ν) ∈ O2 × V2, we have ν(Az≥t− ε
2
) ≥ ν(Az>t− ε
2
) =
ν(X−i\A
z
≤t− ε
2
) ≥ ν(X−i\A
x
<t− ε
4
) = ν(Ax≥t− ε
4
) > ψ−1(t− ε2 ). Hence Pi(z, ν) > t−ε
and the map Pi is continuous. 
For νi ∈ M(X−i) denote by Ri = {x ∈ Xi | Pi(x, νi) = max{Pi(z, νi) | z ∈ Xi}
the best response correspondence of player i given belief νi. The set Ri is well
defined and compact by Lemma 3.
A belief system (ν1, . . . , νn), where νi ∈M(X−i), is called an equilibrium under
uncertainty with Sugeno payoff if for all i we have νi(X−i \
∏
j 6=i Rj) = 0.
The main goal of this paper is to prove the existence of such equilibrium. Since
Sugeno integral does not preserve linear convexity onMX , we can not use methods
from [3] and [6]. We will use some another natural convexity structure on the space
of capacities which has the binarity property (has Helly number 2).
3. Binary convexity on the space of capacities
Consider a compactum X . There exists a natural lattice structure on MX
defined as follows ν∨µ(A) = max{ν(A), µ(A)} and ν∧µ(A) = min{ν(A), µ(A)} for
each closed subset A ⊂ X and ν, µ ∈MX . The lattice MX is a compact complete
sublattice of the lattice [0, 1]τ with natural coordinate-wise operations. The lattice
MX has a greatest element and a a least element defined as µ1X(A) = 1 for each
A 6= ∅, µ1X(∅) = 0 and µ0X(A) = 0 for each A 6= X , µ0X(X) = 1.
By convexity on MX we mean any family C of closed subsets which is stable for
intersection and containsMX and the empty set. Elements of C are called C-convex
(or simply convex). See [16] for more information about abstract convexities.
A convexity C on MX is called T2 if for each distinct x1, x2 ∈ MX there exist
S1, S2 ∈ C such that S1 ∪ S2 = X , x1 /∈ S2 and x2 /∈ S1. Let  L be a family of
subsets of a compactum X . We say that  L is linked if the intersection of every two
elements is non-empty. A convexity C is called binary if the intersection of every
linked subsystem of C is non-empty.
For ν, µ ∈ MX we denote [ν, µ] = {α ∈ MX | ν ∧ µ ≤ α ≤ ν ∨ µ}. It is
easy to see that [ν, µ] is a closed subset of MX . We consider on MX a convexity
CX = {[ν, µ] | ν, µ ∈MX}.
Lemma 4. The convexity CX is binary.
Proof. Let B is a linked subfamily of C. It is enough to prove that intersection of
every three elements of B is not empty by Proposition 2.1 from [10]. Consider any
[µ1, ν1], [µ2, ν2], [µ3, ν3] ∈ B. We can suppose that µi ≤ νi for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
We denote by νA = ∧{νi | i ∈ A} and µA = ∨{µi | i ∈ A} for each A ⊂ {1, 2, 3}. It
is enough to prove that µ123(B) ≤ ν123.
Suppose the contrary then there exists a closed set B ⊂ X such that ν123(B) <
µ123(B). We can choose i ∈ {1, 2, 3} such that ν123(B) < µi(B). Without loss of
generality we can suppose that i = 1. Since the family {[µ1, ν1], [µ2, ν2], [µ3, ν3]}
is linked, we have µ1(B) ≤ µ12(B) ≤ ν12(B). Hence ν3(B) < µ1(B). But then
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ν13(B) ≤ ν3(B) < µ1(B) ≤ µ13(B) and we obtain a contradiction with the fact
that [µ1, ν1] ∩ [µ3, ν3] = ∅. 
Lemma 5. The convexity CX is T2.
Proof. Consider any µ, ν ∈ MX such that µ 6= ν. Then there exists a closed
subset A ⊂ X such that µ(A) 6= ν(A). We can suppose that µ(A) < ν(A). Put
a = µ(A)+ν(A)2 and consider sets O1 = {α ∈ MX | α(A) ≥ a} and O2 = {α ∈
MX | α(A) ≤ a}. Consider the capacity ν1 ∈ MX defined as follows ν1(C) = 0
if A \ C 6= ∅, ν1(C) = a if A ⊂ C and C 6= X and ν1(X) = 1 for a closed subset
C ⊂ X . Then we have that O1 = [ν1, µ1X ] ∈ CX .
Analogously, we can consider the capacity ν2 ∈MX defined as follows ν2(∅) = 0
ν2(C) = a if ∅ 6= C ⊂ A and ν2(C) = 1 if C \ A 6= ∅ for a closed subset C ⊂ X .
Then we have that O1 = [µ0X , ν2] ∈ CX . Obviously, O1 ∪ O2 = MX and µ /∈ O1
and ν /∈ O2. 
4. The main result
We will prove existence of equilibrium introduced in Section 2, moreover we will
show that each νi could be represented as tensor product of capacities on factors.
By a multimap (set-valued map) of a set X into a set Y we mean a map F :
X → 2Y . We use the notation F : X ⊸ Y . If X and Y are topological spaces,
then a multimap F : X ⊸ Y is called upper semi-continuous (USC) provided for
each open set O ⊂ Y the set {x ∈ X | F (x) ⊂ O} is open in X . It is well-known
that a multimap is USC iff its graph is closed in X × Y .
Let F : X ⊸ X be a multimap. We say that a point x ∈ X is a fixed point of F
if x ∈ F (x). The following counterpart of Kakutani theorem for binary convexity
was obtained in [11]).
Theorem 1. Let C be a T2 binary convexity on a continuum X and F : X ⊸ X
is a USC multimap with values in C. Then F has a fixed point.
We use definitions and notations from Section 2.
Theorem 2. There exists (µ1, . . . , µn) ∈M(X1)×· · ·×M(Xn) such that (µ∗1, . . . , µ
∗
n)
is an equilibrium under uncertainty with Sugeno payoff, where µ∗i = ⊗j 6=iµj
Proof. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} consider a multimap γi :
∏n
j=1M(Xj) ⊸ M(Xi)
defined as follows γi(µ1, . . . µn) = {µ ∈ M(Xi) | µ(Xi \ Ri(µ∗i )) = 0}. It follows
from the definition of topology on M(Xi) that γi(µ1, . . . µn) is a closed subset of
M(Xi) for each (µ1, . . . µn) ∈
∏n
j=1M(Xj). Consider ν ∈M(Xi) defined as follows
ν(A) = 1 if A ∩R(µ∗i ) 6= ∅ and ν(A) = 0 otherwise. Then we have γi(µ1, . . . µn) =
[µXi0, ν], hence γi(µ1, . . . µn) ∈ CXi .
Define a multimap γ :
∏n
j=1M(Xj)⊸
∏n
j=1M(Xj) by the formulae γ(µ1, . . . µn) =∏n
i=1 γi(µ1, . . . µn). Let us show that γ is USC. Consider any pair (µ, ν) ∈
∏n
j=1M(Xj)×∏n
j=1M(Xj) such that ν /∈ γ(µ). Then there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and a compactum
K ⊂ Xi \ Ri(µ∗i ) such that νi(K) > 0. Put Oν{α ∈
∏n
j=1M(Xj) | αi(K) > 0}.
Then Oν is an open neighborhood of ν. It follows from Lemma 3 and continuity of
tensor product that there exists an open neighborhood Oµ of µ such that for each
α ∈ Oµ we have R(α∗i )∩K = ∅. Hence for each (α, β) ∈ Oµ×Oν we have β /∈ γ(α)
and γ is USC.
We consider on
∏n
j=1M(Xj) the family C = {
∏n
i=1 Ci | Ci ∈ CXi}. It is easy
to see that C forms a T2 binary convexity on a continuum
∏n
j=1M(Xj) (let us
remark that each M(Xj) is connected). Then by Theorem 1 γ has a fixed point
µ = (µ1, . . . µn) ∈
∏n
j=1M(Xj). Let us show that (µ
∗
1, . . . , µ
∗
n) is an equilibrium
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under uncertainty. Consider any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then µi(Xi \ Ri(µ∗i )) = 0. We
have by Lemma 1 µ∗i (
∏
j 6=iXi \
∏
j 6=iRj(µ
∗
j )) = 0. 
Remark 1. Many results of our could be deduced from general results obtained in
[11] but we give direct (not difficult) proofs here because otherwise it would require
introducing additional categorical notions.
References
[1] W.Briec, Ch.Horvath Nash points, Ku Fan inequality and equilibria of abstract economies in
Max-Plus and B-convexity, J. Math. Anal. Appl. 341 (2008), 188–199.
[2] A. Chateauneuf, M. Grabisch, A. Rico, Modeling attitudes toward uncertainty through the use
of the Sugeno integral, Journal of Mathematical Economics 44 (2008) 1084–1099.
[3] J.Dow, S.Werlang, Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty: breaking down backward
induction,J Econ. Theory 64 (1994) 205–224.
[4] D.Dubois, H.Prade, R.Sabbadin, Qualitative decision theory with Sugeno integrals, arxiv.org
1301.7372
[5] D. Dubois, J.-L. Marichal, H. Prade, M. Roubens, R. Sabbadin, The use of the discrete
Sugeno integral in decision making: a survey, Internat. J. Uncertainty, Fuzziness Knowledge-
Based Systems 9 (5) (2001) 539-561.
[6] J.Eichberger, D.Kelsey, Non-additive beliefs and strategic equilibria, Games Econ Behav 30
(2000) 183–215.
[7] I.Gilboa, Expected utility with purely subjective non-additive probabilities, J. of Mathematical
Economics 16 (1987) 65–88.
[8] R.Kozhan, M.Zarichnyi, Nash equilibria for games in capacities, Econ. Theory 35 (2008) 321–
331.
[9] O.R.Nykyforchyn, M.M.Zarichnyi, Capacity functor in the category of compacta, Mat.Sb. 199
(2008) 3–26.
[10] T.Radul, Absolute extensors and binary monads, Applied Categorical Structures, submitted
[11] T.Radul, Nash equilibrium with Sugeno payoff, preprint
[12] T.Radul, A functional representation of capacity monad, Topology 48 (2009) 100–104.
[13] A. Rico, M. Grabisch, Ch. Labreuchea, A. Chateauneuf Preference modeling on totally or-
dered sets by the Sugeno integral, Discrete Applied Mathematics 147 (2005) 113–124.
[14] D.Schmeidler, Subjective probability and expected utility without additivity, Econometrica 57
(1989) 571–587.
[15] M.Sugeno, Fuzzy measures and fuzzy integrals, A survey. In Fuzzy Automata and Decision
Processes. North-Holland, Amsterdam: M. M. Gupta, G. N. Saridis et B. R. Gaines editeurs.
89–102. 1977
[16] M.van de Vel, Theory of convex strutures, North-Holland, 1993.
